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Temptation and Consequence: Dilemmas in Videogames The Prisoner's Dilemma And Cooperation Another useful model for examining the mechanisms behind temptation and dilemmas can be found in the Prisoner's Dilemma. The situation involves two prisoners being held for trial. For the purpose of this example, we shall call them Bowser and Zelda. Bowser and Zelda are both being held in separate cells with no means of communicating with each other. The warden of the prison offers them each the opportunity to confess their involvement in the alleged crime, with the following conditions:
If both prisoners deny any involvement in the crime, the lack of evidence will only allow the warden to imprison both suspects for two years. Let us examine the thoughts of the suspects as they agonize over this dilemma: Bowser is
not exactly sure how Zelda is going to respond to the offer. If Zelda
stays silent, and Bowser confesses, Bowser will be allowed to go free-an
appealing proposition, for sure. On the other hand, if Bowser joins Zelda
in silence, they will both get two years. Between these two options, Bowser
is obviously leaning towards confession to minimize his jail stay. Herein lies the dilemma. Both Bowser and Zelda, being rational beings, are going to reach the same conclusion: confession is the best strategy, regardless of what their partner-in-crime decides to do. This is known as a dominant strategy. However, they have been betrayed by their intuition. If they both end up following their dominant strategies and confessing, they will both end up with four-year prison sentences. This is a considerably worse result than if they had both chosen to ignore the logic of the dominant strategies and remain silent, which would have resulted in each only receiving a two-year sentence. The resulting consequence by following the dominant strategy is known as a Nash equilibrium. The following "payoff matrix" summarizes the cooperation (silence) and defection (confession) consequences of this dilemma, color coded by character:
There are several payoff consequences for the decisions made in each scenario. These are:
In order for a true Prisoner's Dilemma to exist, these payoff values must abide by the following relationship: T > R > P > S Under this condition, the dominant strategy of each prisoner will lead them to a situation where their rewards will be less than if they had both acted irrationally and cooperated. In Disney Interactive's Zoog Genius, a particularly interesting gameplay mechanism arose from the concept of the Prisoner's Dilemma and the potential role cooperation and defection could play in a two-player contest. The title is essentially a videogame presentation of a television gameshow-featuring curriculum-based questions and hosted by the Zoog character set-that can be played by either one- or two-players. As a Disney title, particular care needed to be taken to ensure that the two-player mode presented some cooperative element to provide some offset to the inherently combative nature of a competitive head-to-head contest. Still, since this was still being positioned as a learning title, it remained important to not alter the basic quizshow elements that encouraged individual excellence. The game itself presents a fairly straightforward gameplay mechanic: category selection, question presentation, answer choices, and answer selection. In approaching any tried-and-tested gameplay model, the challenge becomes one of introducing enough unique elements to make the game stand out from other similar titles, while keeping the delivery familiar enough that all players can quickly understand the rules. The decision was made to create a cooperative bonus possibility in the two-player mode during selection of the category for the upcoming question. During normal gameplay, the active player uses the "1" through "3" keys to select a category from three presented onscreen. The corresponding question is presented along with the four possible answers, and the player is given a fixed amount of time to respond. A correct answer adds points to their game total, while an incorrect answer will deduct points. At the end of the game, the player's game point total is added to a cumulative running "ZQ Total," which is used to unlock bonus questions sets in the game at predefined point thresholds. The special two-player cooperative bonus mechanism introduces a unique element-joint category selection. The three possible questions categories are presented as usual, but now both players are expected to select (Player 2 uses the "J," "K," and "L" keys). If the two players disagree on the category, the game will randomly select from the two categories chosen, and the game proceeds as usual. But if the two players happen to cooperate and select the same category, a point bonus is awarded to the player that successfully answers the following question. Note that the cooperative bonus mechanism in Zoog Genius cannot be considered a true Prisoner's Dilemma since the players are sitting side-by-side and thus are capable of communicating their intent to one another. Also, in the original dilemma, the prisoners had no way of knowing what the other had chosen until it was too late, while in Zoog Genius, one player can wait for the other to select their category before making their decision. Furthermore, there is no way to determine the dominant strategy, as the "cooperate" and "defect" payoff values cannot be precisely calculated or measured. However, the strategic element introduced by the pseudo-dilemma scenario of the cooperative bonus mechanism is nonetheless heightened over the traditional category selection system. For example, if the goal of both players is to unlock more bonus questions in the game, they will want to increase the game's running "ZQ Total." The result is likely to be increased cooperation-that is, agreement in category selection-in order to maximize the point value of each question (and then hope that whichever player responds actually gets the answer correct). On the other hand, players playing competitively may demonstrate different cooperative tendencies depending on their scores and how deep there are into the game round. Early on, both players are likely to be more interested in selecting a category that favors their strengths in a particular subject area, so they may increase their likelihood of answering the question correctly and gaining a lead over their opponent. However, later on in the game the tendency to cooperate may change depending on the balance of the scores. A player who has fallen behind may be more willing to cooperate in order to have a chance at a question with a higher point value, while the player in the lead may want to ensure that the point values of the questions do not allow the trailing player an opportunity to gain ground. Even a more direct application of the Prisoner's Dilemma can allow the videogame designer to inject compelling elements into videogames. Imagine an online real-time combat strategy where two non-aligned players are building and customizing their spacecrafts and given a budget of $10,000. The game requires bartering and trading between players to acquire the raw materials necessary for ship building, but at a high transaction cost ($8,000 of total "shipping and handling" in a typical game round). A technology becomes available that allows goods and merchandise to be "transported" between players instantly and with no transaction cost. In order for it to work, the technology requires that two people possess these machines, which carry a fairly high price tag of $5,000 each. Let us review these assumptions:
Under these conditions, what is a player likely to do? If both players purchase the transporter equipment, they will reduce their transaction costs for the game from the usual $8,000 to a one-time cost of $5,000 for the transporter-a savings of $3,000. Everybody is happy. If, on the other hand, neither player purchases a transporter, the transaction costs throughout the game for each player will amount to the usual $8,000. The two players are not particularly happy, but at least neither is bankrupt. What if only one player purchases the machine? With nobody else to connect the transporter to, their machine becomes effectively useless, resulting in them receiving the "sucker's payoff"-the cost of the equipment plus the added cost of continuing to barter using the traditional costly method ($5,000 + $8,000 = $13,000). This will render them bankrupt within a few rounds, allowing the remaining player to overtake their inventory for free once they have left the game. The following payoff matrix is produced:
In applying
the logic of the earlier Bowser and Zelda example, the dominant strategy
for both players will lead to a Nash equilibrium of remaining in the "Status
Quo" situation of not adopting the new cost-saving technology. This
will result in both players being considerably worse off than if they
had both ignored their intuition and each purchased the transporters. Conclusion Most writers of literature today typically do not rely on deus ex machina ("God from the machine") to falsely wrap up complicated plot threads, recognizing that many modern audiences are offended by such contrived means of rescuing the hero or advancing the storyline. Likewise, videogames should be designed to avoid having players make random selections and forced decisions to advance the gameplay in artificial ways. Dilemmas, temptation, and consequence thus become crucial items in the game designer's toolbox. The Monty Hall puzzle has shown that by devious staggering of information the player can be engaged in a more realistic way, heightening the immersion and sense of realism. The Prisoner's Dilemma, on the other hand, revealed an insidious mechanism for encouraging players to pursue cooperative communication and trust-based solutions to further their own personal interests. Both of these techniques require the player to analyze and evaluate multiple options and demonstrate non-trivial analytic and decision-making skills, resulting in a richer, more rewarding gameplay experience Sources Axelrod,
Robert, The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, 1984. ______________________________________________________  [Back
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