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Features

Postmortem:
Nayantara's Star Chamber
What
Went Wrong
Major
tech licensing issues - I had to switch back-end technology
ten months into the project. This hurt badly, and was the biggest
impediment in trying to reach my one-year estimate of getting the
game out. The back-end technology I was planning on using was the
one powering Digital Addiction's Sanctum. When Digital Addiction
went bankrupt, it was forced to sell its assets, and the Sanctum
game was bought by a group of players who formed a company called
NIOGA (Non-profit International Online Gaming Association). When
I first started work on Star Chamber, I had discussions with
NIOGA about using the Sanctum technology, and it seemed likely,
at the time, that they would be willing to let me license the technology
for a relatively small fee and a small percentage of future sales.
Somehow, though, over the months, after I was already building hooks
into the client to use their back-end (with their blessing, assuming
a deal would be worked out), the numbers that were verbally discussed
changed into numbers that weren't palatable to me. So not only had
I wasted some time writing code to hook into their server, but now
I was on my own in terms of coming up with appropriate substitute
technology. However, there were several silver linings: instead
of forcing my game to conform to their more limited tech, I could
go on to design a server that would have more and better features,
my new server would be written in a language (C++) that I could
maintain and upgrade more easily, and I would own it without having
restrictions.
Trial
play is a double-edged sword - While try-before-you-buy
is a great opportunity for certain consumers and for the company
when those trial players convert into paying customers, it is arguably
a bad business model, for a couple reasons. With a small player
population and a multiplayer game, new trial players are likely
to play not against other trial players, but against veterans. The
veteran will usually defeat the newbie, and many newbies will be
turned off from the experience, because they feel they're diving
into a pool of sharks. They would simply prefer to play against
other newbies, or learn by themselves. I talked to a veteran producer
at a games publisher after we launched, and he suggested that demos
and trial play can actually dramatically lower the sales of your
game. With regard to the above problem, it may be that novice players
who have already paid for something will be much more likely to
"stick it out" in a situation where they have some skill
ramping to do, in order to learn how to actually play the game.
Single-player
issues - I didn't think enough about single player, and
this is, perhaps, where my focused vision backfired. I didn't think
a single player element was necessary at all. Indeed, the model
of giving away the client for free and only selling digital cards
doesn't really support putting effort into a solid single player
experience. But when we went into the beta test, it became apparent
that the players wanted a single player mode, even if it didn't
have a good AI. This way, the players would be able to learn the
game and practice on their own, without the nuisance of having to
find an online opponent, and perhaps because of pride and embarrassment
issues. So while we did end up launching with a Practice Mode, allowing
players to test their decks against a dumb computer opponent, not
having a better single player mode probably hurt sales of the game
significantly.
Not
enough eCommerce options at launch - We launched with PayPal
support only, and without credit card support. We were in that state
for about two months, and were in the unfavorable position of losing
potential customers who didn't want to use PayPal. We did have card
resellers who would buy packs of cards with PayPal and then resell
them to players, but many casual players don't want to be bothered
going through that kind of effort in order to buy our product. When
our resellers lost their ability to accept credit cards, it became
critical that we implement credit card acceptance.
Insufficient
load testing before launch - We didn't get enough of a
chance to load test before Star Chamber's official release,
and as a result, we didn't find some crash bugs with the server
when certain unlikely conditions were met. In late December 2003
and early January 2004, after we received some good press, the server
started crashing erratically as the number of players online had
reached an all-time high. This resulted in a lot of lost sleep and
a frantic search to find and eliminate the bugs.
While
we did write a test client that would connect to the server, chat
randomly, create games, and then quit out, our tests weren't thorough
enough to find all the bugs with the server - a fairly complex multithreaded
application. We should have put more thought and energy into this,
as the instability was a big annoyance to our players.
Unexpectedly
long development time - Morale and motivation dropped dangerously
low because of the working environment and the longer-than-expected
development time. For more than two years, I was working alone in
the backroom of my house. While I worked with contractors for a
good year, they worked from their homes hundreds to thousands of
miles away from me. Without a spirit-boosting buddy system available,
I went through some dark and lonely times, and was tempted to give
up several times during the long course of development. Thankfully,
with the support of family and friends, I was able to finish the
game.
Conclusion
The
making of Star Chamber was a brutal, draining ordeal; I was
silly and naïve to undertake such a project by myself. If I
had known it would take more than two years from start to finish,
I would never have started. I can recall reaching the alpha test
point in September 2002, and how it felt like I had been working
on the game forever. Even then, I was overambitious in my expectations
of getting to and through beta test in order to release the game.
I imagine this doesn't apply to certain categories of games, but
for a CCG/strategy game, do not underestimate the amount of testing
that your title will need to go through. The Star Chamber
beta test began in late December 2002 and continued until the end
of May 2003. Even when the beta test concluded, I wasn't ready to
release the game. I had been working so hard during the beta test,
making game balance changes as well as interface and production
value improvements that I was completely burned out mentally, and
I hadn't even finished all the preparatory work to actually sell
the product online. After the beta test ended, I had to take a mental
health break, and I put the finishing touches on the game during
the summer. In November 2003, the game was finally ready for release.
While
I'm quite proud of the game, and it has achieved some critical success
(Star Chamber is currently rated #74 on GameSpot's
Top Rated Games list), Star Chamber cannot be called
a commercial success, at least not up to this point. While it has
attracted a small following of players, it hasn't come close to
the potential that I thought, and still believe, it had. Whereas
high-budget games count subscribers in the tens or even hundreds
of thousands, Star Chamber has not yet reached 2,000 paying
customers, and has never had more than 250 simultaneous monthly
subscribers (subscriptions are optional, and you can play forever
without ever purchasing a subscription).
However,
what we have achieved has been with an extremely limited marketing
budget (online advertisements only), and no distribution assistance
- we're still looking for publishing partners for the game, if interested
parties would like to contact
us. However, we continue to support the product with tournaments,
updates, and releases of new card sets - the first expansion, Incursions,
was released in July of 2004 and we are currently working on a second
expansion due out this winter. Overall, the team still believes
in Star Chamber, especially as it offers a unique gaming
experience with little competition in its field, and, despite the
ups and downs of development, are delighted with the final results.
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Publisher:
Nayantara Studios
Developer: Nayantara Studios
Number of full-time developers: 1
Number of part-time developers: 0
Number of contractors: 4
Length of development: 2 ½ years
Release Date: November 10, 2003
Target Platform: PC
Development Hardware: My pitiful Win95 PC for about
6 months, then a more modern PC.
Development Software: Visual C++
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